Team success relies on assigning team members to the right tasks. We use controlled experiments to study how the mechanism used for assigning roles within teams affects team performance.
and Crystal Clear. The shift toward agile software development included a move toward teams that are self-managed (Anderson, 2004) . Teams using Scrum, for instance, meet on a regular basis to set shortterm goals. No specific team member is designated as the team leader. Tasks are assigned via discussion among the team members, with the idea that team members know more about each other and the tasks to be performed than any outside individual.
Because software development offers a broad variety of methods for assigning individuals to tasks, it seems like exactly the right environment for studying the effect of different methods of role assignment.
We instead argue that software development illustrates why using field data to study the relative effectiveness of different methods is problematic. Agile software development involves a multitude of changes to traditional methods of software development, and any two implementations differ on multiple dimensions. For example, some implementations of agile software development have team members share a large bullpen office to facilitate communication while others do not. Even if there existed sufficient variation that the effect of different elements of the process could be identified via multivariate regressions, there would remain the problem of endogeneity. It is not random what software development process is adopted by a particular firm and no obvious instrument exists for the process adoption decision.
These problems of variation along multiple dimensions and endogeneity are not unique to software development, and are likely to affect any study based on naturally occurring field data.
We therefore turn to laboratory experiments. Using a task where role assignment is critical, we study the relationship between how roles are assigned and team effectiveness. Because the laboratory is a controlled environment, we exogenously determine crucial elements of the environment such as incentives, information available to team members, and (most importantly) the process by which roles are assigned.
In our experiment, subjects play a simplified version of the takeover game (Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985) . This game has a Buyer and a Seller. The Seller has a single item to sell. She knows the value of this item while the Buyer only knows the distribution of values and that the value of the item to the Buyer is always 150% of the value to the Seller. The Seller's payoff maximizing strategy is trivial:
she should accept any bid greater than her value. Because of the asymmetric information between Buyers and Sellers concerning the item's value, the Buyer faces adverse selection. In choosing a bid he needs to understand that the expected value of the item conditional on having his bid accepted is less than the expected value ex ante. The adverse selection is sufficiently severe that submitting a bid equal to the lowest possible value is the Buyer's expected payoff maximizing strategy.
Previous work on the takeover game has focused on why the winner's curse (over-bidding) occurs, but our intent is to use the takeover game to understand how task assignment affects team performance.
For our purposes, two features of the takeover game are particularly valuable. First, the Buyer and Seller roles differ greatly in difficulty. The Seller's optimal strategy is trivial, but previous work (e.g., Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer and Bazerman, 2007; Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf, 2008; Charness and Levin, 2009 ) has established that Buyers have a great deal of difficulty understanding that they need to bid low due to adverse selection. Second, play by freely interacting teams reduces but does not eliminate overbidding in the takeover game (Casari et al, 2012) .
1 This allows us to study the relationship between the importance of role assignment and the degree of interaction between teammates.
In the initial phase of the experiment, all subjects play as Buyers facing a series of computerized Sellers. In control sessions the Buyers continue to play against computerized Sellers for the second phase of the experiment. For the other four treatments in our experimental design, subjects are matched into teams of two players each. One teammate plays exclusively as a Buyer and the other plays exclusively as a Seller. Each plays a series of takeover games against Buyers and Sellers from other teams and split their earnings evenly. Teammates never play against each other, so their interests are perfectly aligned. The four treatments with teams systematically vary along two dimensions: (1) the Buyer and Seller roles are either assigned randomly and exogenously or are endogenously agreed upon by the two teammates, and (2) teammates either play independently, only interacting through their shared payoffs, or are given periodic opportunities to chat about how to play the game. Ex ante, we expect either endogenous role assignment or chat between teammates to improve the Buyers' performance by lowering bids. 2 We find that chat leads to significantly lower bids as expected. Endogenous role assignment has little effect, raising (rather than lowering) bids by a small amount that is far from statistical significance. This is surprising since our data has all the necessary conditions for endogenous role selections to lower bids.
Bids from the initial phase should provide a clear measure of ability, and the data confirms that bids are significantly lower in the second phase when the more able teammate (i.e., the low bidder in the first phase) is assigned to the Buyer role. Endogenous role selection generates selection in favor of the more able Buyer, with Buyers in the endogenous role selection treatments bidding significantly lower than
Sellers. The problem is that Buyers who are endogenously assigned their role bid significantly higher, controlling for ability, than Buyers who are randomly assigned this role. This unexpected effect more than reverses the positive effects of selection in favor of more able subjects. The dialogues between teammates provide direct evidence that endogenous role selection negatively affects the quality of the discussion between teammates on how to play the game.
1 In Casari et al. (2012) groups consist of three members who are all in the role of buyers (while sellers were computerized). Unlike the work we present below, their paper does not focus on role assignment and how it affects team performance. 2 The Seller's role is sufficiently trivial that we expected subjects to get it right regardless of treatment. The data supports this expectation.
The negative effect of endogenous role selection on Buyers' performance, controlling for ability, is the primary result of our paper. Given the unexpected nature of this result, any explanation is necessarily ex post. The design and data allow us to dismiss some possibilities. For example, subjects are given a large amount of time to discuss their decisions and there are no obvious differences between teams who discuss up until the time limit and those who end early. We therefore can dismiss time constraints as a cause of the negative effect. We instead speculate that we are observing an effect of cognitive load. The intuition is straight forward. Individuals only have a limited budget of cognitive resources available.
Adding a task that requires use of these resources necessarily leaves less for other tasks, leading to less rational behavior. 3 Even though subjects don't spend a huge amount of time discussing role selection, it presumably requires some thought. This presumably leads to less thought being devoted to bidding, consistent with the reduced time spent discussing how to bid as well as the reduced quality of decisions about bidding.
2) The Takeover Game The Seller's optimal strategy is simple -she should accept a bid if it is (weakly) greater than the value and reject otherwise. The Buyer's optimal bid is less obvious. If the Seller is behaving optimally, the Buyer's expected payoff maximizing bid is 90. This is also the optimal bid for a risk averse buyer. In evaluating the profitability of a bid, the Buyer has to consider the expected value of the item subject to the bid being accepted. In other words, the Buyer must account for adverse selection. Table 1 illustrates the 3 Psychology offers many examples where increased cognitive load reduces the ability of individuals to reason and/or learn. For example, Johnson-Laird and Wason (1970) find that increasing the cognitive load of subjects reduces their ability to correctly solve logic problems. In experimental economics the issue of cognitive load has come up in studies of spillover for subjects playing multiple games. For instance, Bednar, Chen, Liu, and Page (2012) compare subjects playing games in isolation with subjects playing paired games. They find efficiency reducing spillovers between games and report evidence that cognitive load is at least partially responsible for the effect. See also Savikhin and Sheremeta (2012) and Falk, Fischbacher and Gaechter (2010) for related work on cognitive spillovers and cognitive load. Increasing cognitive load is also known to have other economically relevant effects, such as changing individuals' risk and time preferences -see Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2012) for a summary of this literature.
basic features of the Buyer's problem. A bid of 1200 induces all Sellers to accept the bid, including those with low (V = 90) and medium (V = 600) values. Because the expected value of an item is only 630 points, even after a 50% mark-up it isn't worth enough to make the bid profitable. The expected loss is large, 255 points, and Buyers lose money for two thirds of their bids. Similar reasoning for a medium bid of 600 yields an expected loss of 82.5 points. Unlike a high bid, however, feedback isn't going to make it obvious that a bid of 600 is a bad idea, because bids make money as often as they lose money and the expected loss isn't enormous. Learning to bid 90 is going to be difficult unless the Buyer recognizes the adverse selection problem and realizes that the only way to avoid losing money is to bid at the lowest possible value.
Table 1 about here
Our version of the takeover game borrows important features from Charness and Levin's (2009) "shifted" versions of the takeover game. The optimal bid of B = 90 earns the Buyer a small but steady profit. This avoids a problem with many versions of the takeover game where optimal play calls for earning no money and essentially taking no actions by never buying the item. Under these circumstances, action bias (Patt and Zeckhauser, 2000) becomes a plausible cause of overbidding that cannot be attributed to a failure to understand the expected payoffs of various bids. Setting a positive minimum value also means that the optimal bid isn't at the edge of the set of available bids. If pure errors play a role, it is possible to make an error that leads to underbidding as well as errors that lead to overbidding.
3) Experimental Design
Our experiment consisted of two parts. The first part, covering Rounds 1 -10, was identical in all treatments. The second part (Rounds 11 -40) differed across treatments. The initial instructions explained only Part 1, including three questions to check for understanding (see the appendix for the instructions).
Instructions for Part 2 were distributed after the conclusion of Part 1.
In Part 1, all subjects were in the role of Buyers. Sellers were computerized and always sold the indivisible item if the Buyer's bid was equal to or larger than the item's value in a given period. Buyers knew about this rule. Each subject received starting capital of 12 Euros (3000 experimental points) for Part 1 from which possible losses could be covered. 4 After each round, subjects got feedback about the item's value, whether they had bought the item or not, and how large their profit was.
In Part 2 we introduced five different treatments which are explained in the following. proposals about how to assign roles by clicking on a specific assignment on the computer screen and sending the proposal to the other member. Proposals for role assignment could be accompanied by selecting from a pre-arranged list of reasons. Possible reasons were (i) because one member did better in Part 1, (ii) because a particular role was easier to play, (iii), because a particular role was more fun, and (iv) because a subject did not like to take risks. These four reasons were the most common justifications for wanting a particular role in the ChatEndogenous treatment (see below). Subjects were free to send as many messages back and forth as they wanted within a two minute window. Pretesting indicated that this was more than sufficient time for teams to exchange messages. The idea was to let subjects communicate about role assignment, as in the Chat-Endogenous treatment, but to eliminate any possibility of discussing how to bid.
After the two minutes for communication were over, subjects had to enter which role they wanted. If both teammates entered the same role, implying a conflict of interest, the role assignment was randomly determined. Otherwise, roles were assigned as requested by the teammates.
5) Chat -Endogenous. This treatment is identical to Chat -Random, except that roles were determined endogenously within each team. After the five minutes of chat before Round 11, the teammates were assigned roles using the same mechanism as in No Chat -Endogenous (teammates simultaneously enter which role they want, and conflicts are resolved randomly).
The instructions for the chat gave subjects no guidance on the content of their discussions, but they did know how roles would be assigned prior to beginning the chat and most teams discussed role assignment. Note that the assignment of roles could not be changed during the chats before Rounds 21 and 31.
The experiment was run with a total of 592 participants, all of them students at the University of Innsbruck (which has a total of about 28,000 students). Recruitment was done using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) , and the sessions were computerized with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) . We had 112 participants in treatment Control, and 120 in each of the other four treatments. No subject participated in more than one session. On average, an experimental session lasted about 90 minutes. The average earnings per subject were 17 Euros.
4) Hypotheses
A bid of 90 maximizes expected value assuming no errors on the part of Sellers. If we make the more realistic assumption that some sellers will reject bids that yield them very small profits, a rational but risk averse individual would choose a slightly higher bid than 90. We therefore define a Buyer as submitting an "optimal bid" if he bids in the range 90 ≤ B < 135. 6 Only bids in this range have positive expected value in theory, and in practice bids in this range are clearly payoff maximizing (as will be shown in Section 5). Given the results of previous studies on the winner's curse and the takeover game, we anticipate subjects will have difficulty learning to bid optimally. While some Buyers no doubt stumble on optimal bidding by chance, having the basic insight of adverse selection should lead directly to bidding optimally. Moreover, once gained this insight is easily transmitted to a teammate. Optimal bidding therefore falls roughly into the class of "eureka" problems -difficult problems whose solution can be easily explained to another individual once the underlying logic is understood.
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Comparing the Control and No Chat -Random treatments, differences in bidding can occur because Buyers in the No Chat -Random treatment share their payoffs with a teammate or because computerized Sellers do not make errors while humans potentially do. The latter possibility can largely be dismissed, as documented in Section 5. Sharing payoffs could lead to more substantial differences in bidding. Suppose that the effort spent on figuring out how to bid optimally is costly. If we assume that our subjects are largely self-regarding (i.e. put little weight on the payoffs of others), the rewards from learning to bid optimally are larger when Buyers keep their entire payoff rather than sharing it with a teammate. Combined with effort costs, this implies that bids will be lower in the Control treatment than in the No Chat -Random treatment.
Hypothesis 1: Bids will be lower in Rounds 11 -40 of the Control treatment than in the No ChatRandom treatment.
In treatments with chat, the Buyer and Seller in a team get multiple possibilities to discuss bidding. If the Seller has learned to bid optimally and understands why this is a good strategy (i.e. understands the adverse selection), she should communicate her insights to the Buyer since profits are shared. Even if the Buyer has not previously learned to bid optimally, he should recognize the optimal strategy when it is explained to him and bid optimally in the future. This is the essence of the "truth-wins" model of team decision making pioneered by Lorge and Solomon (1955) . A freely communicating team should perform no worse at solving eureka problems than the most able member of the team would perform. Although the truth-wins model is often too optimistic about the performance of teams, experimental studies by economists and psychologists universally find that teams outperform individuals at solving eureka problems since at least some useful sharing of insights takes place between teammates. 8 This implies that bids will be lower in treatments with chat than the corresponding treatments without chat.
Hypothesis 2: Bids will be lower in Rounds 11 -40 in treatments with chat than in treatments without
chat.
In the treatments with endogenous role assignment it is no longer random who receives the role of Buyer. If the goal is to make as much money as possible, the teammates should attempt to get the most able individual in the role of Buyer since the role of Seller is trivial and, as shall be seen, it matters little who fills this role. The teammates have access to an excellent indicator for who will do a better job as the Buyer -their earnings from the first ten rounds. There is high correlation between earnings in the first ten rounds and bidding low in the first ten rounds, and individuals who bid low in Rounds 1 -10 also tend to bid low in Rounds 11 -40. 9 If teams systematically pick the individual who earned more in Rounds 1 -10 to be the Buyer for Rounds 11 -40, we expect that they will on average bid lower and earn more in Rounds 11 -40 than teams with randomly selected roles.
Hypothesis 3: Bids will be lower in Rounds 11 -40 in treatments with endogenous role assignment than in treatments with randomly assigned roles.
We have no clear prediction about how the effect of role assignment should vary when chat is or is not available. On the one hand, having chat may strengthen the selection effect. We have given subjects in No Chat -Endogenous a selection of messages that includes the most commonly used justifications for wanting a particular role in Chat -Endogenous, but their ability to communicate is still necessarily limited. This limitation could plausibly affect their ability to assign the more able teammate to the Buyer role. On the flip side, role assignment should be less important in Chat -Endogenous.
Teammates in this treatment have multiple opportunities to communicate. If the Seller is more insightful than the Buyer, she can pass her insights along to the Buyer. It therefore ought to matter less whether the more able individual becomes the Buyer. These two effects, better selection and less importance for 8 For summaries of the psychology literature, see Davis (1992) and Kerr and Tindale (2004) . Evidence from economic experiments studying play of games includes Cooper and Kagel (2005 ), Casari et al, (2012 , and Charness, Karni, and Levin (2010) . 9 The correlation between an individual's average bid and average points earned in Rounds 1 -10 is -.599. This is statistically significant at the 1% level (t = 17.54). Looking at the Control treatment, where nothing changes between Rounds 1 -10 and Rounds 11 -40, the correlation between an individual's average bids in Rounds 1 -10 and Rounds 11 -40 is .613 (p < .01).
selection, have opposite signs. Whether endogenous role assignment matters more with or without chat is an empirical question.
5) Results

Rounds 1 -10:
In all treatments, subjects begin the experiment by playing ten rounds as a Buyer facing the computer in the role of Seller. The cluster of bars on the left side of Figure 1 shows the distribution of bids for Rounds 1 -10. Bids have been broken into the same seven categories used in Table 1 to show the logic of bidding a low amount. There are four categories (B < 90, 135 ≤ B < 600, 900 ≤ B < 1200, and B ≥ 1800) where the Buyer never earns money unless the Seller makes an error.
Choices in these four categories, which can be regarded as unambiguous errors, are rare. The remaining three categories (90 ≤ B < 135, 600 ≤ B < 900, and 1200 ≤ B ≤ 1800) can make money if the right value is drawn. As explained previously, only the first category (90 ≤ B < 135) has positive expected value.
Figure 1 about here
A little less than half of the bids are optimal (90 ≤ B < 135) in the first ten rounds. Many subjects immediately grasp the need to bid optimally, but many don't. This is a scenario in which team play with communication should help since there will be many matches between an individual who doesn't bid optimally with a subject who does. Of course, subjects don't fall neatly into categories of those who "get it" and those who don't. Only 10% of the subjects never bid optimally in Rounds 1 -10 and only 17% always bid optimally. Looking at demographic effects on bidding behavior, we find that men bid significantly lower than women (average bids of 366 vs. 425; p < .05 in a regression not shown here) and that subjects with the best math grade bid lower than the other subjects (average bids of 337 vs. 410; p < .05). There is no significant effect from a subject's age or German score.
Sellers in Round 11 -40: Underlying the hypotheses developed in Section 4 is an assumption that
Sellers always behave optimally (in terms of maximizing monetary payoffs), accepting bids that are strictly greater than their value and rejecting bids strictly less than their value. In the Control treatment this happens by design, and suboptimal decisions by Sellers in the other four treatments are relatively rare. Define an error as rejecting a bid strictly greater than the item's value or accepting a bid strictly less than the item's value. Errors are observed for only 4% of observations in Rounds 11 -40. It was inevitable that human Sellers would make at least some errors. The critical issues are whether the error rate varies across the four treatments with human Sellers and whether errors change the logic in favor of submitting an optimal bid (90 ≤ B < 135 Turning to the second issue, even with Sellers' errors it remains optimal to submit a bid in the range 90 ≤ B < 135. Across the four treatments with human Sellers, the average payoff in Rounds 11 -40 from submitting a bid in this range was 21 points which is unambiguously higher than the average payoff from submitting a bid in the range 600 ≤ B < 900 (-89 points) or the range 1200 ≤ B < 1800 (-299 points).
For all four treatments with human Sellers the average payoff from submitting a bid in the range 90 ≤ B < 135 is at least 100 points higher than the average payoff from submitting a bid in the range 600 ≤ B < 900. As expected, these differences in payoffs are driven by adverse selection. Subjects who submit bids in the range 600 < B < 900 almost always get their bid accepted for middle value items (93%). The problem is that these bids are also almost always accepted for low value items (94%) and almost never accepted for high value items (2%). Figure 2 shows average bids by Buyers in all five treatments. The data is broken down into ten round blocks and data is included from Rounds 1 -10, the rounds before the treatments are in effect, to show the differing starting points for the treatments. The data for Rounds 1 -10 is taken from all subjects, including those who became Sellers in Rounds 11 -40. Figure 2 suggests that the opportunity to chat reduces bids, but endogenous role assignment does not.
Treatment Effects for Buyers:
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate two different ways that endogenous role selection could affect bids. First, endogenous role assignment is predicted to reduce bids relative to random role assignment because of selection. Teammates who are better at the difficult problem of bidding should get the more challenging role of Buyer. The best-case scenario is "perfect role assignment," where the most able individual is always assigned the more critical role of Buyer. We did not run a treatment with exogenously imposed 10 To test the statistical significance of differences between treatments, we ran a probit regression using all observations with human Sellers where an error was possible (i.e. bid ≠ value). The independent variables were treatment dummies (Chat -Random, No Chat -Endogenous, and Chat -Endogenous) and controls for the value, bid, and time period. Using the No Chat -Random treatment as the base, the parameter estimates for the three treatment dummies were .023, -.205, and -.027 with standard errors (corrected for clustering) of .166, .163, and .185. None of the differences between treatments are statistically significant and the three treatment dummies are not jointly significant (χ 2 = 2.85; 2 d.f.; p > .10).
perfect role assignment, but our design makes it possible to replicate what data from such a treatment would have looked like. Using bids in Rounds 1 -10 as a proxy for ability as a Buyer, we can replicate a treatment with exogenous perfect role assignment by using data from the treatments with random role assignment and selecting only those teams where the low bidder in Rounds 1 -10 is randomly assigned the Buyer role. 11 Data from this subsample provides a baseline for how well endogenous role selection would have performed if it had no effect on learning and yielded perfect role selection. so it appears that the four treatments are starting at the same point.) In subsequent ten round blocks the average bids are changed as they did in the real data from the endogenous role assignment treatments. Figure 4 therefore shows how the data would evolve if endogenous role assignment had no effect on role 11 This subsample replicates exogenous perfect role assignment because there is no selection affecting whether the low bidder becomes the Buyer or the Seller.
selection (yielding equal starting positions), leaving only the effect on learning. Arrows have again been added to make it easier to see the effects of endogenous role assignment. Endogenous role assignment slows the learning process both with and without chat, with the effect being somewhat larger with chat.
This unexpected harmful effect of endogenous role assignment on learning counteracts the positive effect of better role assignment and drives the most surprising result of our paper, the failure of Hypothesis 3.
As a secondary point, Figure 4 shows that the effect of endogenous role assignment, after eliminating effects due to selection, is not vanishing with experience. It narrows slightly with chat and grows somewhat without chat, but both changes are small. Even though endogenous role selection only comes into play at one point in time relatively early in the experiment, Buyers never seem to catch up from the disruption that it causes.
Table 2 about here
The regressions reported in Table 2 are designed to analyze the data in more detail. The dataset for these regressions includes all observations from our data. The dependent variable is the amount bid by the Buyer. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
An obvious feature of the data is strong individual effects. To correct for these, all of the models use a linear specification with fixed effects. The fixed effects are identified from choices in Rounds 1 -10, before any of the treatments take effect. The first row of Table 2 In developing hypotheses about the treatment effects, we noted the lack of a clear prediction about how the effect of endogenous role assignment would vary depending on whether or not chat was available. To check whether or not the effect varies in practice, we've modified Models 3 and 4 to separately estimate the effect of endogenous role assignment with and without chat (see Table A .2 in the appendix for these regressions). The effect of endogenous role assignment is larger with chat regardless 12 The interaction with the dummy for Rounds 11 -40 is necessary to avoid collinearity with the fixed effects. 13 These results are robust to restricting the sample to the three treatments without chat (i.e. the cases where the effects of a Buyers' characteristics cannot be affected by interaction with the Seller).
of whether the fixed effects are at the team or Buyer level, but in neither model is the difference between the effects with and without chat statistically significant.
14 We've also modified Models 3 and 4 by interacting the dummies for Control, chat, and endogenous role selection with dummies for each ten round block. This lets us see whether the treatment effects fade with experience. The results of these modified regressions are consistent with the results of Models 3 and 4. Specifically, consistent with our discussion of Figure 4 , the effect of endogenous role selection, after controlling for any effects due to selection, does not get weaker with experience.
We summarize the results up to this point by revisiting our initial hypotheses. The following conclusions refer to bids in Rounds 11 -40. 
Conclusion 2: Bids are lower in treatments with chat than in the corresponding treatments without chat.
The data supports Hypothesis 2.
Conclusion 3: Bids are higher in treatments with endogenous role assignment than in the corresponding treatments with random role assignment. This difference is significant when effects due to changes in the learning process are isolated. The data provides no support for Hypothesis 3, and instead indicates that endogenous role assignment harms the ability of Buyers to learn the optimal bidding strategy.
Comparing Buyers to Sellers in the Endogenous Role Assignment Treatments:
This subsection examines more closely how roles are assigned in the two treatments with endogenous role assignment. Table 3 compares Buyers and Sellers along a number of dimensions. Recall that prior to selecting a Buyer the subjects were given information about their teammate's age, gender, math score, German score, and earnings in Rounds 1 -10. Table 3 shows, for each of these characteristics, the median values (except for gender where we report the proportion of women) for subjects who ended up in the roles of Buyer and Seller broken down by treatment. The final row of Table 3 shows the median of an individual's average bids in Rounds 1 -10. 15 Although subjects did not know the average bids of their teammate in Rounds 1 -10, this is a natural measure of who showed more ability in the early rounds. For each characteristic in each treatment, we ran a Wilcoxon signed rank test of the null hypothesis that the median difference between the Buyer and Seller in a pair equals zero.
16 can not be attributed to a lack of selection.
Conclusion 4: In both treatments with endogenous role assignment, Buyers bid significantly less in
Rounds 1 -10 than the Sellers they are paired with.
Does It Matter Who Becomes the Buyer? It would matter little whether Buyers bid less than
Sellers for Rounds 1 -10 if teams performed the same regardless of which teammate took which role. 
Figure 5 about here
In both cases the average bid for Rounds 11 -40 is lower when the teammate who bid lower in Rounds 1 -10 is given the role of Buyer, but the effect is quite a bit stronger in the treatments without chat than in those with chat. With chat, a Seller who understands the benefits of bidding low can pass this understanding on to the Buyer. This should lead to lower bids and average bids depending less on the identity of the Buyer with chat, exactly the patterns observed in Figure 5 . The extreme case of this is the truth wins model, which predicts that the identity of the Buyer is irrelevant in the treatments with chat because Buyers and Sellers will perfectly share their insights. The data shown in Figure 5 is not consistent with this prediction.
Table 4 about here
The regressions shown in Table 4 Under the truth wins model, a team's performance should be equivalent to the performance of its more able member. This implies that bids in Rounds 11 -40 should depend more strongly on the bids in Rounds 1 -10 of the teammate who bid lower (and hence is presumably more able). When the Buyer was the low bidder, this prediction is confirmed. The estimate for the Buyer's average bid in Rounds 1 -10 is significant at the 5% level while the estimate for the Seller's average bid is smaller and not significant. The fixed effect approach used in Table 2 isn't feasible here, since the fixed effects would be collinear with the independent variables. bid lower in Rounds 1 -10. "Buyer wins" would be a more accurate description of our data than "truth wins". It follows that even with chat it matters which teammate is chosen as the Buyer.
While the truth wins model performs poorly, the sellers' advice does have some impact on bidding. If we rerun Model 2 without the interaction terms for which teammate was the low bidder (i.e. the only independent variables are the Buyer's and Seller's average bids for Rounds 1 -10), the estimated effect of the Seller's average bid in Rounds 1 -10, while much smaller than the effect of the Buyer's average bid, is significant at the 10% level. 
Content of Conversations:
When Buyers are randomly selected, chat improves the quality of bidding, albeit less than the truth wins model would suggest. Given that the more able teammate, as measured by bids in Rounds 1 -10, generally ends up as the Buyer in the Chat -Endogenous treatment, we would expect that bids would be even lower in this treatment than in the Chat -Random treatment.
The fact that bids are higher in the Chat -Endogenous treatment, significantly so if we control for selection into the Buyer role, suggests that something must be going wrong in the interaction between teammates. To determine what exactly causes the problem, we turn to the content of the conversation between teammates.
We focus on the conversations that took place between Round 10 and Round 11. As can be seen in Figure 4 , this is where the major divergence between the two chat treatments occurs. Recall that subjects were given five minutes to chat and could not move on to the next stage of the experiment until the five minutes had elapsed. The goal was to give subjects adequate time to discuss how to bid and (when relevant) role assignment without any incentive to rush through the conversation to make the experiment Looking at what teams said, we see significant differences between the two chat treatments. We coded every team for whether they discussed how to bid and, as a subcategory of this, if they specifically discussed the benefits of optimal bids. The coding was initially done independently by two research assistants. We then had the two coders discuss all the discrepancies in the coding and agree on a single decision for coding. This final coding was used for the analysis to be reported in the following. We allowed for the possibility that even after discussion the coders would not agree on a coding. In these rare cases (1 observation) the coding was assigned a value of ½. Using a single coding simplifies our discussion of the chat content but has little effect on our conclusions since there was a high degree of agreement between the two initial codings.
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In the Chat -Random treatment, 78% of the teams discussed how to bid, but in the ChatEndogenous treatment only 61% of the teams did so. This difference is significant at the 5% level (t = 2.12; p = .036). Even stronger, more teams specifically discussed optimal bidding in the Chat -Random treatment (63%) than in the Chat -Endogenous treatment (35%) with the difference significant at the 1% level (t = 3.12; p = .002). Teams in Chat -Endogenous do a poor job of discussing how to play the takeover game, helping to explain why endogenous role selection harms Buyers' ability to learn to bid optimally.
One possible explanation for the relative lack of substantive conversations in the Chat -Endogenous treatment is the time constraint. Even with the generous time provided for chat, if teams spend most of this time discussing who should take which role it may leave insufficient time to discuss how to bid. Two features of the data argue that the time constraint does not play an important role in reducing discussions of bidding. First, the chat content for teams that talk up to the time constraint isn't much different from those who do not. The 41 teams in the Chat -Endogenous treatment that sent a message in the last 20 seconds (and hence were possibly time constrained) were slightly, but insignificantly, more likely than average to have discussed how to bid (65% vs. 61% for all 60 teams) and to have specifically discussed bidding low (37% vs. 35% for all 60 teams). Second, the vast majority of the discussions on role assignment were short. The most common pattern was that one of the teammates proposed a role, the other accepted the proposal, and they moved on to other things. 22 The rapid assignment of roles left ample time to discuss bidding, yet many teams failed to do so.
The relative failure of teams in the Chat -Endogenous treatment to discuss bidding in general, especially bidding low, largely explains why bids are significantly higher than in the Chat -Random treatment after controlling for selection into the Buyer role. With Buyer fixed effects, the estimated difference between the two chat treatments in Rounds 11 -40 is 89.22 with a robust standard error of 45.80 (see Table A .2 in the appendix). If this regression is modified to include a control for whether the 21 The cross-coder correlation was 0.55 for the category "discussed how to bid" and 0.49 for "bidding low", both significant at the 5% level. An average cross-coder correlation of around 0.5 (as in our case) is well accepted in social psychology (see, e.g., Orbell et al., 1988 Although the teammate who bid lower in Rounds 1 -10 was significantly more likely to become the Buyer in both treatments with endogenous role assignment, this was far from universal. Pooling across the two treatments, almost a third of the teams (38/118) picked the individual who bid higher in Rounds 1 -10 as the Buyer. These failures cannot be attributed to small differences in average bidding, as the difference in average bids was greater than 100 for 28 of the 38 teams where the low bidder did not become the Buyer. The message content helps explain why the low bidder did not always become the Buyer.
Almost all of the teams (54/60) in Chat -Endogenous discussed which teammate should be the Buyer, but impasses where teammates failed to implement an agreement on roles are not uncommon (18/54). Even among the 36 teams who successfully implemented an agreement on roles, 11 chose the teammate who bid higher in Rounds 1 -10 as the Buyer. The discussions of role assignment are typically brief and often miss basic points. For example, only 9 teams discussed performance in Rounds 1 -10 as a reason for assigning roles. Not only did endogenous role assignment harm teams' discussion of how to bid, but they also had low quality discussions about who should be the Buyer.
The discussion of role assignment went a little better in No Chat -Endogenous, but not much.
Every team sent at least some messages, with an average of 3.7 messages sent between teammates. Most teams reached an agreement (42/60), and most of those agreements were justified on the basis of who had performed better in Rounds 1 -10 (28/42). This sounds good until you notice that less than half the teams reached an agreement based on performance in the early rounds! In this light, it is surprising that teams did as well as they did at assigning the low bidder to the role of Buyer.
6) Conclusion
The primary purpose of our study was to investigate the relationship between how roles are assigned within a work team and team performance when teams consist of pairs where one member has a considerably more difficult task than the other member. We found that teams perform better when team members can communicate with each other and share information and discuss strategies. When team members are also allowed to assign roles endogenously, this feature has a positive effect on role assignment, leading to assigning the more able persons to the more difficult Buyer role. However, controlling for this selection, we find that endogenous role assignment increases Buyers' bids, completely counteracting the helpful effects of selection. The latter result is surprising and casts doubt on whether self-management of teams and internal role assignment is good for team performance and thus for companies in general.
Our results suggest some counter-intuitive advice for the assignment of tasks in teams. It is common wisdom that more employee involvement is better and that top-down management is counter-productive.
There is certainly some truth to these assertions (see Ichniowski and Shaw, 1999) , but traditional topdown management may not be entirely bad. When employees actively participate in choosing their roles, this increases the number of tasks that they need to perform. If there is interference between tasks and managers are reasonably well informed about workers' abilities, exogenously assigning roles may free up employees' attention to focus on more critical tasks.
A final question is why endogenous role assignment has a negative effect on Buyers' performance.
This effect was unexpected, so our experiments aren't designed to answer this question per se.
Nonetheless, the experimental design and data allow us to eliminate some possibilities. Time constraints do not explain the effect, since subjects are given more than adequate time for discussion, only hold brief discussions about role assignment, and do not appear to behave any differently in teams where the time constraint binds. The fact that the effect isn't dying out also suggests that the issue is not time constraints.
Monetary incentives are held constant between sessions with random and endogenous role assignment, and therefore cannot explain the effect. Another possibility is that Buyers didn't want the role, and are bidding higher to intentionally harm their teammate. Given that we don't observe dialogues where teammates fight over who should get the Seller role, this seems unlikely. This leaves us with the possibility raised in the introduction. Having subjects responsible for assigning roles increases their cognitive load. With less cognitive resources available to think about bidding, we see less rational behavior both in terms of the discussions and actual bids. Subject to confirmation in future sessions, we observe a well-known psychological factor having a major economic impact in an experiment that was not designed to generate an effect due to cognitive load. This suggests the need for further study of how loading employees with extra tasks, even ones that they might view as desirable, can harm their performance. 
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Appendix -Experimental instructions Instructions for the experiment
Welcome to this experiment! Thank you for taking your time to participate. Please refrain from talking to other participants until the experiment is finished. In case you have any questions after we have read through the instructions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your seat and will answer it.
Two parts of the experiment
This experiment has two parts. In the following, you'll get the instructions for part 1. The instructions for part 2 will be distributed at the end of part 1.
Instructions for part 1
Initial endowment For part 1 you get an initial endowment of 12 €. This endowment will be included in the profit for the first period.
Number of periods
Part 1 has 10 periods. In each single period, you can buy cards, the value of which will be determined randomly. We will now explain the exact procedure within each period.
Submitting bids for a card in each period
In each period, you can submit a bid for a card that has a certain nominal value. This nominal value will be determined randomly in each period. A card can have three possible nominal values (in points):
• 90
• 600
• 1,200 Each of these three values is equally likely to be drawn. In other words, this means that each nominal value will be realized with a probability of 1/3. The realization of nominal values is independent across periods. This means that the realization in the preceding period has no influence whatsoever on the realization in the current period.
You will submit a bid for a card before you learn about the realized nominal value. The bid must be an integer number in the interval from 0 (zero) to 2,000 (with 0 and 2,000 included in the interval). The actual nominal value will be determined after you have submitted your bid.
Profits from bids
If your bid is larger or equal to the nominal value of the card, then you buy the card. In this case you get 150% of the card's nominal value. However, you also have to buy the card in this case.
If your bid is smaller than the nominal value, then you don't buy the card. This means that no transaction takes place, and you don't earn anything in this case.
Instructions for part 2 (these are for the Chat -Endogenous treatment; instructions for the other treatments are analogous and available upon request)
Roles of buyers and sellers Part 2 is similar to part 1. However, in this part there will be buyers and sellers of cards. The task that each role has to perform is explained below.
Number of periods
Part 2 has 30 periods.
Fixed pairs and how to assign roles
It is important in this part that at the beginning of it, fixed pairs of buyers and sellers will be formed. These pairs will remain fixed throughout the whole part 2.The fixed pairs have a strong influence on the profits from this part (see more on this at the end of the instructions for part 2!).
At the beginning of part 2 you will have an option to exchange messages with the partner in your pair. For this purpose, we have installed an instant-messaging-program in the software. In order to use it, you have to write your message into the empty row at the bottom of your screen, and then you have to push "Enter" to send your message to your partner. Once you send you send a message, it is shown on your partner's screen and on your screen (above the empty row). Note that no other participant in the room can see your message.
You can send any message you like, expect for the following limitations:
• Please do not reveal your identity. This also includes information that allows your personal identification.
• Please do not use any abusive language.
Before you can start using the instant-messaging-program, you'll receive some information about the partner in your pair. More precisely, you'll be informed about his or her age, gender, field of study, population of hometown, working status, experience with economic experiments and the profit in part 1.
At the end of the 5 minutes of chatting in the instant-messaging-program, you need to indicate whether you would prefer to be buyer or seller. If one person in a pair indicates a preference for being in the role of buyer, and the other person indicates a preference for the role of seller, then the roles will be assigned exactly as preferred by both members of the pair. If this is not the case, then roles will be assigned randomly.
Before period 21 and 31 you will again have 5 minutes time to exchange messages with your partner. Roles may not be changed in the course of communication before these periods, however. As soon as the periods start, no further communication is possible.
Interaction of buyers and sellers
In each period there will be an interaction between a buyer and a seller, in which they decide about buying, or respectively selling, a card. It is very important to note that you will never interact with the partner in your team! This means that if you are a buyer, for example, you will never trade with the seller in your pair, and vice versa. In each period, it will be randomly determined which buyer will interact with which seller (taking care of the limitation that interaction within pairs is impossible). In each period it is equally likely to interact with any of the participants in the opposite role of yours. Recall that the interaction always takes place with someone from a different pair.
How to buy a card in each period
Buyers are in the same situation as all participants were in part 1 of the experiment. In each period you can bid in the role of buyer for a card. The card's nominal value will be determined randomly as in part 1. To remember: the nominal value may be 90, 600, or 1,200, with equal probability.
In each period, you have to submit a bid as an integer number from 0 to 2,000, including both 0 and 2,000. The card's nominal value will be determined and revealed after you have placed your bid.
As the buyer, you get an initial endowment of 10 € for part 2, and as seller you get 2 €. This endowment will be added to the profit in the first period of part 2. However, please note the rules for determining payoffs within pairs at the end of this set of instructions! Selling a card in each period and profits of the seller In the role of seller you are the owner of the card that can be sold in each period and for which the buyer places a bid. You can earn money in the role of seller if you sell the card to the buyer. You will be informed about the card's nominal value (either 90, 600, or 1,200) and the buyer's bid before you decide whether or not to sell your card. If you sell the card, then you earn the buyer's bid minus the card's nominal value. For example, if the card has a nominal value of 600 and the buyer has bid 712, then you earn 112 points if you sell the card. Assume that the card had a nominal value of 600, the buyer bid 457 and you sold it, then you lose 143 points. Whenever you don't sell the card, then you don't earn anything in this period, but you also don't lose anything.
Profits from buying a card
As in part 1, a buyer gets 150% of the card's nominal value if the seller sold it to him or her. Once the seller has sold the card, the buyer has to buy it. Field of study 0=economics and business; 1=medicine; 2=political science; 3=psychology; 4=sociology; 5=other.
Population of hometown 0=under 5.000; 1=5.000 to 10.000; 2=10.000 to 25.000;
3=25.000 to 50.000; 4=50.000 to 100.000; 5=100.000 to 500.000; 6=more than 500.000.
Working status 0=Full time student; 1=Full time student plus part time worker;
2=Full time student and full time worker; 3=Part time student; 4=Part time student and part time worker; 5=Part time student and full time worker; 6=neither student nor worker; 7=No student, but part time worker; 8=No student, but full time worker.
Experience with experiments 0=never participated before; 1=1 to 3 times participated; 2=4 to 10 times participated; 3=11 to 20 times participated; 4=more than 20 times participated.
Math grade in highschool leaving exam ("Matura")
Grades range from 1 to 5 (in integers). "1" is the best grade, "5" the worst.
German grade in highschool leaving exam ("Matura")
Grades range from 1 to 5 (in integers). "1" is the best grade, "5" the worst. 
